WhatsApp IP Check: Bounded Browser Exit, Dual-Stack & Multi-Source Risk Diagnostics

An external checker can only observe the connection your browser makes to that checker. Proxy clients frequently apply domain- or app-based split-tunnel rules where whatsapp.com, web.whatsapp.com, or mobile app traffic may follow a different outbound policy than ipok.io.

Moreover, no web page can inspect local proxy client configurations, TUN interfaces, or private system processes. Always pair the diagnostics on this page with your proxy client's live connection logs for WhatsApp domains.

On mobile or dual-stack broadband networks, a proxy rule that only covers IPv4 may leave IPv6 traffic untunneled. IPOK's main card and dual-stack card independently query ip4.ipok.io and ip6.ipok.io to echo each stack's exit IP (without creating an application-level v4/v6 pairing record).

When both IPv4 and IPv6 exits respond, dual-stack reachability by itself is not a leak, and different addresses or ISP labels across the two stacks do not by themselves prove a tunnel bypass. IPOK references RFC 7359 dual-stack tunnel traffic-protection considerations so you can verify against your client routing rules and connection logs whether the other stack left your intended tunnel and exited directly via your local ISP. If the other stack times out or does not respond, that does not prove IPv6 is disabled or absent, nor does it prove safety or absence of a leak.

IPOK combines public ASN/BGP declarations and upstream metadata (such as ipapi.is company.type, asn.type, and is_datacenter) for bounded hosting (35-point contextual floor) vs. residential/ISP inference, and compares GeoIP country (geo.countryCode) with registration country (rdap.country ?? intel.asn.country) for native vs. broadcast clues (see https://ipok.io/en/t/datacenter-or-residential and https://ipok.io/en/t/native-ip). This is heuristic inference, not 100% absolute identification.

Across up to 10 registered risk sources, IPOK shows AbuseIPDB report counts and confidence when returned, while Scamalytics is attempted on explicit IP lookups when the shared cache misses and quota permits (or under narrow residential top-up rules). EvidenceSummary.confidence (and directSources) indicates only whether direct risk flags (Tor 90, blocklists 70, proxy/VPN 65, abuser 55) came from a single source or multiple sources (collection independence unverified). Pair this with the on-click WebRTC probe (contacting Google / Cloudflare public STUN with local ICE parsing and no candidate upload to IPOK) and leak.ipok.io DNS resolver exit check (5 minutes of readable lifetime; expired records become unreadable, are cleared on subsequent session activity, and may remain in memory while idle; falling back to bash.ws only if initial token issuance fails, not a DNS pollution test); see https://ipok.io/en/privacy.